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The Impact of RICO Forfeiture on Legitimate Business
Graeme W Bush*
In 1984, Congress passed the first in a series of amendments to the
forfeiture provisions of the federal criminal code, including RICO,'
designed to strengthen prosecutors' ability to take the profit out of crime
by forfeiting a convicted criminal's assets. The Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 19842 added the relation back doctrine, vesting title to
forfeitable property in the government at the date the crime is committed
and giving third parties limited rights to assert claims against forfeited
property. In 1986, Congress passed the substitute assets provision that it
had rejected in 1984.3 Under this new doctrine, the federal government
can, in certain circumstances, satisfy a criminal forfeiture order out of
any assets of a defendant, even if the specific property ordered forfeited
is no longer in existence. Finally, from 1984 to the present, Congress has
passed legislation extending forfeiture as a penalty for an increasing
number of federal crimes. The Money Laundering Control Act of 19864
as a practical matter made forfeiture available for almost every federal
crime, including most white collar crimes, since the deposit in a financial
institution of money derived from criminal activity renders the money
forfeitable. 5 These legislative enhancements and expansions have made
forfeiture the penalty of choice for law enforcement officials.
The increasing use of forfeiture creates serious pitfalls for legitimate
businesses engaged in transactions with persons accused of criminal ac-
tivity. The pervasiveness of the penalty, combined with the breadth and
flexibility of the statutory definitions and the severe impact of the rela-
tion back or "taint" doctrine, make it extremely difficult to predict what
property will be forfeited to the government in any particular case. Inno-
cent persons who exchange legitimate goods or services for what turns
out to be "tainted" property run the risk that they will not get good title
to that property and may ultimately lose the benefit of a normal commer-
cial transaction. In its effort to take the profit out of crime, the govern-
ment often takes the profit from those with whom the criminal has dealt.
In short, criminal law has invaded the marketplace.6
* Partner, Caplin & Drysdale, Washington, D.C.
1 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
2 Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976-2194 (1984).
3 Department ofJustice Assets Forfeiture Fund Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570,
tit. I, subtit. D., §§ 1151-53, 100 Stat. 3207-12 to 13 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C., titles 28, 19, 18, and 21, including 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988)). See infra note 31 and accom-
panying text.
4 Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. I, §§ 1351-67, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C., titles 12, 18, and 31).
5 Id. at § 1366 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 981-82 (1988)).
6 One might well say that criminal law has always been a part of the marketplace in that it
regulates and sets the outer bounds for acceptable commercial conduct. But the invasion of the
forfeiture penalty is a different kind of intrusion. Unlike a criminal statute that directly defines pro-
scribed conduct, the forfeiture penalty has collateral consequences for persons who have conformed
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How does the new forfeiture offensive affect legitimate businesses?
What rights does a business have when faced with the forfeiture of prop-
erty belonging to a customer, a borrower, or an investment partner?
What are the obstacles to the assertion of property rights, and how can a
business evaluate and limit its exposure to collateral forfeiture? This Ar-
ticle will survey the remedies available to a business asserting rights in
forfeitable property of a defendant charged with violations of RICO. In
the course of the survey, an effort will be made to identify and discuss
those aspects of RICO forfeiture that make the third party remedies weak
and uncertain. Finally, the Article will focus on the statutory requirement
that the government trace forfeitable property. This requirement may
provide a third party the means to determine which of a RICO defend-
ant's assets can be used to satisfy legitimate commercial obligations with-
out danger of ultimate forfeiture to the government.
I. RICO Forfeiture and Third Party Rights
A. A Survey of Obstacles to Third Party Rights
As a legitimate business evaluates its exposure to forfeiture orders
that may be entered against a customer or business partner, a two-fold
problem arises. First, the forfeiture provisions are draconian and are
motivated by the desire to make a criminal sanction severe and sure.
They are not driven by the desire to protect the rights of third parties,
although they make allowance for third party rights. Nor do they have the
objective, as the Uniform Commercial Code does, of establishing a set of
bright-line rules to make commercial relationships clear and certain.
Under forfeiture law, the deck is stacked against the defendant and
against the business that deals with him.
Second, RICO is extremely vague in many important respects; the
outcome in any particular situation is highly dependent on the manner in
which a prosecutor exercises his discretion. The substantive provisions
that define predicate crimes may apply in many different ways to the
same underlying conduct. These different applications can have dramati-
cally different consequences for third parties who have claims against the
defendant or interests in the defendant's property. The procedural pro-
visions that control the manner in which rights in forfeited property are
determined, albeit less vague, are extremely stingy and restrictive in al-
lowing third parties to assert claims against forfeited property. Conse-
quently, when a business attempts to evaluate its exposure to forfeiture,
it is faced with a task that is formidable and unlikely to produce much
comfort or certainty.
1. The Determination of What Crime May Be Charged
When a business first learns that a customer may be the subject of a
RICO investigation, it will want to determine what the likely conse-
their conduct to the requirements of the criminal law. Although not charged with a crime, such
persons may nevertheless by damaged, in certain circumstances, by a criminal penalty imposed upon
someone else.
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quences of the investigation will be and how various possible outcomes
might affect the business. The first problem will be to obtain a reliable
account of the facts. Typically, the target of the investigation will be un-
willing to provide much, if any, information about the case. The target
will likely disclose only general and exculpatory information. Likewise,
the government will not reveal any details about its investigation, and
whatever information is released will be general and condemnatory. The
business will very likely have to proceed with its evaluation with a mini-
mal factual record. 7
Even if all the facts were known, however, the evaluation of the busi-
ness' exposure would still be difficult. The first problem is determining
which RICO violation the government will charge. RICO gives the gov-
ernment tremendous flexibility in deciding how to charge criminal activ-
ity. A violation of RICO occurs when a person acquires, maintains or
operates an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.8 A
"pattern" is at least two predicate acts, which for purposes of white collar
criminal activity includes the standard white collar substantive crimes of
mail and wire fraud. 9 Although there has been extensive litigation over
what combination of predicate crimes is necessary to satisfy the pattern
requirement, the government faces a very low hurdle and can usually be
expected to meet the statutory requirement that the predicate acts are
related to a common purpose and demonstrate a threat of continued
criminal activity.10
A very significant source of uncertainty arises from the enterprise
requirement. An enterprise can be an individual or an entity, such as a
corporation or a partnership, or it can be an association-in-fact enter-
prise, defined as "any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity."'I1 One set of facts can often be characterized
7 Third parties dealing with a potential RICO defendant will rarely, if ever, have a complete or
reliable understanding of the facts upon which the prosecutor will base his decision. Of course, the
prosecutor will not share the fruits of the investigation with a third party for a variety of reasons,
including grand jury secrecy obligations. See Fed. R. Grim. P. 6(e). Potential defendants are very
likely to deny all allegations of wrongdoing, to demand performance of commercial obligations by
third parties, and to assert that the third parties have no basis on which to renege. As third parties
increasingly become embroiled in criminal forfeiture proceedings, one can anticipate that commer-
cial agreements will contain cooperation clauses or other provisions designed to protect third parties
by requiring full disclosure of facts pertaining to potential criminal charges.
8 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988).
9 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988).
10 The universe of predicate crimes encompasses more than 50 crimes, including most of the
substantive crimes of the federal criminal code, as well as certain state law crimes such as bribery.
The commission of any two of these crimes can constitute a "pattern" for purposes of section 1962.
A stream of litigation, which focused on whether two predicate crimes are sufficient to make out a
"pattern" culminated in the Supreme Court's decision in HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2899-900 (1989), requiring that the predicate crimes have both relatedness and
continuity to constitute a pattern. Lower court interpretation of H.J., Inc. has failed to significantly
restrict the pattern requirement.
11 18 U.S.C. 1961(4) (1988). There has been some litigation over whether an association-in-fact
enterprise is limited to an association of "individuals," or whether it can also include corporations or
other entities. See, e.g., Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146,
1151 (D.NJ. 1983) (two corporations and two individuals may not combine to form an association-in-
fact enterprise), aff'd in part and rev'd in part 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211
(1985); Radionic Indus., Inc. v. GTE Prod. Corp., 665 F. Supp. 622, 627-29 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (corpo-
ration and its employees may not). Notwithstanding the statutory language, which refers to an associ-
[Vol. 65:996
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by a prosecutor in different ways with respect to the enterprise charged.
For example, where predicate crimes have been committed in a corpo-
rate context, a prosecutor could charge that the corporate entity is the
enterprise, or he could charge that the enterprise is an association-in-fact
of the corporate entity or entities and various individuals-including of-
ficers, directors, and others who may have dealt with the corporation or
its customers. The enterprise concept is inherently plastic because it is a
statutory invention and does not refer exclusively to preexisting concepts
of legal entities and individuals. This plasticity gives prosecutors tremen-
dous flexibility and makes it very difficult for third parties, who have no
control over the charging decision, to predict exactly what consequences
will flow from a given set of facts.
2. Determining What Property Is Forfeitable
RICO permits the government to obtain two distinct kinds of forfei-
ture as a result of a RICO conviction. The government may require a
convicted RICO defendant to forfeit all of his interest in any property
affording a source of influence over the enterprise ("enterprise forfei-
ture") 12 and/or to forfeit any proceeds of racketeering activity or any
property "derived from" such proceeds ("proceeds forfeiture").' 3
Third parties have difficulty evaluating the possible scope of entei'-
prise forfeiture for several reasons. The first is the above-mentioned
plasticity of the statutory definition of enterprise. Because the prosecu-
tor's decision as to how to define the enterprise directly affects what
property may be forfeited, the secrecy of that decision inhibits the third
party's ability to analyze the likely scope of forfeiture. For example, if
individuals are charged with operating a corporation, defined as an en-
terprise, through a pattern of racketeering activity, then each individual
ation of "individuals," the weight of authority is that entities can be part of an association-in-fact
enterprise. See, e.g., United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 352-53 (D.C. Cir.) (individuals, corpora-
tions, and other entitles may constitute an association-in-fact enterprise), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821
(1988); United States v. Navarro-Ordas, 770 F.2d 959, 969 n.19 (11 th Cir. 1985) (a group of corpo-
rations may), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); United States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822, 828 (3d Cir.
1983) (individuals and a corporation may), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984); United States v. Thevis,
665 F.2d 616, 625-26 (5th Cir.) (individuals and corporations may), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982);
United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393-94 (2d Cir. 1979) (a group of corporations may), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); Fustok v. Conticommodity Serv., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1074, 1075-76
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (three corporations may).
12 Section 1963(a)(1) & (2) provide that a convicted defendant shall forfeit:




(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over,
any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or partic-
ipated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
13 Section 1963(a)(3) provides that the convicted defendant shall forfeit:
any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained, di-
rectly, or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection in violation of
section 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (1988).
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defendant's interest in the corporation will be forfeited upon conviction.
Persons doing business with the corporation could anticipate a change in
ownership and control in the event of conviction, but they would still be
able to look to the corporation and its assets to satisfy business obliga-
tions. On the other hand, if the enterprise charged is an association-in-
fact enterprise, including the corporation, the possibility exists that the
assets of the corporation would be forfeitable either as proceeds derived
from illegal activity or as property affording a source of influence over
the association-in-fact enterprise. In this event, a business' claim against
the corporation would be in jeopardy. The prosecutor's decision as to
what enterprise to charge in an indictment-a very discretionary deci-
sion-can accordingly have a dramatic impact on a third party's exposure
to loss.
Forfeiture presents another danger to the third party because it
often operates counter-intuitively. A business dealing with a person
under threat of RICO conviction may not expect that property which is
not tainted-i.e. not derived from or the proceeds of any criminal activ-
ity-may be subject to enterprise forfeiture. Once a RICO violation has
been proven, the defendant's interest in the enterprise is forfeited. A fur-
ther trap for the unwary or unsophisticated third party is that a very small
amount of illegal activity conducted through an enterprise may result in
the forfeiture of the entire enterprise, subject only to the statutory and
constitutional limitation that the forfeiture be proportional to the magni-
tude of the crime.1 4
Another uncertainty derives from the ambiguity of the requirement
that any "source of influence" over the enterprise be forfeited.' 5 There
are many ways in which a person may have "influence." The statute does
not define what degree or kind of influence is required to trigger forfei-
ture, nor does it define what constitutes a source of influence.' 6
Although this provision has not been used frequently by prosecutors, it is
14 Challenges to RICO forfeitures on the ground that the forfeiture is wholly disproportionate
to the magnitude of the offense have met with limited success. See, e.g., United States v. Angiulo, 897
F.2d 1169, 1211-12 (Ist Cir. 1990); United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1364-65 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied 110 S. Ct. 53 (1989); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 927 (1980). These decisions distinguish between forfeitures of the enterprise itself, which are
not limited by a proportionality principal, and forfeitures of interests "outside" the enterprise, which
must be proportional to the magnitude of the offense.
15 See supra note 12.
16 The "contribution" theory, which some courts have accepted in the continuing criminal en-
terprise ("CCE") context, adds further uncertainty to the third party's analysis of what property may
be forfeited by persons with whom the third party does business. See, e.g., United States v. McK-
eithen, 822 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1458-59 (11 th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 143 (N.D. Ga. 1979),
aff'd on other grounds, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982); United States v.
Ragonese, 607 F. Supp. 649, 652 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'dmem. 784 F.2d 403 (11th Cir. 1986). Under
this theory, any property that has contributed to the success of the association-in-fact enterprise is
deemed to be the defendant's contribution to the enterprise and is forfeitable as "source of influ-
ence" property or "interest in" property. This theory could potentially be used broadly in the com-
mercial context to determine what property constitutes an interest in an association-in-fact
enterprise.
1000 [Vol. 65:996
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so ambiguous and undefined that it can fairly be characterized as a
minefield for the unwary (and even the wary) third party.1 7
Proceeds forfeiture, as opposed to enterprise forfeiture, focuses on
benefits derived from illegal activity and therefore is more consistent
with a layperson's understanding of what property would be subject to
forfeiture. Nevertheless, there are some traps for the third party in pro-
ceeds forfeiture as well. Not only are proceeds themselves forfeitable,
but so also is property derived from such proceeds. In a commercial con-
text, derivative proceeds are inherently ambiguous. Cash received from a
tainted commercial transaction goes into a common fund and is used to
make purchases and to satisfy obligations of the business. Although the
language and structure of the statute would seem to require some kind of
tracing in order to demonstrate the derivative nature of any particular
asset,18 it is not at all certain that the courts will implement the apparent
tracing requirement with any vigor.
3. The Relation Back Doctrine and Post-Conviction Proceedings
The risk inherent in evaluating what property may be forfeited is
increased by the draconian nature of the penalty and by the limited abil-
ity of third parties to assert rights in such property once it has been for-
feited. If a defendant is convicted of RICO violations, title to any
property forfeited to the government as a result of the conviction is
deemed to have passed to the government as of the date of the criminal
activity. Accordingly, if a third party takes a security interest in or is paid
with what is eventually found out to be forfeitable property, title to that
property was held by the government and was therefore never effectively
transferred to the third party.
Although RICO provides for the assertion of third party claims
against forfeited property, the statutory procedure for making such
claims is narrowly restricted. Section 1963(1) permits a person to file a
petition asserting an interest in forfeited property following a conviction
and notice by the government of the forfeiture. The third party has the
burden of demonstrating at a post-conviction hearing on the petition
that: (i) he has an interest in the forfeited property; and (ii) either (a) his
interest was superior to the defendant's at the time of the commission of
the crime, or (b) he acquired an interest in the property after the crime
was committed but is a bona fide purchaser who was, at the time he ob-
tained the interest, "reasonably without cause to believe" that the prop-
erty was forfeitable.' 9
17 One of the unanswered questions about the source of influence prong is whether the source
must have been used to affect the conduct of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity. If, for example, X Corp. owns 10% of the stock of Y Corp., and also has an employee who serves
as the president of Y Corp. and engages in racketeering activity through Y Corp., what is the source
of influence: the officer position occupied by the president, the stock in Y Corp., or both? Does it
matter whether the Y Corp. stock was ever used by X Corp. to "influence" Y Corp. to commit illegal
acts? These questions remain unanswered.
18 See infra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
19 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1) (1988).
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RICO appears to make the post-conviction proceeding the sole
method for asserting rights in forfeited property. 20 Third parties have
no way of establishing whether they are at risk of losing a property inter-
est in a defendant's property prior to the outcome of the criminal trial.
Once a third party arrives at the post-conviction hearing, there are signif-
icant obstacles to the vindication of the claim. The third party may be
barred by the criminal conviction from litigating the propriety of the for-
feiture of the defendant's property, even though the third party had no
opportunity to appear at the proceeding to contest the forfeiture. 21 The
third party may not be entitled to a jury trial. 22 Finally, the third party
may not be permitted to make a claim against forfeited assets based on
an unsecured claim against the defendant because an unsecured third
party claim may not constitute an "interest" in the forfeited property. 23
4. Restraining Orders
Section 1963 also permits the government to obtain a restraining
order precluding the transfer of forfeitable assets.24 The government
can obtain the restraining order either before or after indictment. A
hearing is required for a pre-indictment restraining order,25 unless the
government can satisfy the conditions for an ex parte restraining order.26
Post-indictment, a court may issue a restraining order without any prior
hearing, based solely upon the finding of probable cause in the indict-
ment.2 7 Although the legislative history makes plain that a subsequent
20 Section 1963(i) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (1), no party claiming an interest in property subject to
forfeiture under this section may-
(1) intervene in a trial or appeal of a criminal case involving the forfeiture of such
property under this section; or
(2) commence an action at law or equity against the United States concerning the va-
lidity of his alleged interest in the property subsequent to the filing of an indictment or
information alleging that the property is subject to forfeiture under this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(i) (1988).
21 Id.
22 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l)(2) (1988).
23 Courts have split on the question of whether an unsecured creditor may make a claim against
forfeited assets in post-conviction proceedings. Compare United States v. Campos, 859 F.2d 1233
(6th Cir. 1988) (unsecured creditors not bona fide purchasers) with United States v. Reckmeyer, 836
F.2d 200, 207 (4th Cir. 1987) and United States v. Mageean, 649 F. Supp. 820 (D. Nev. 1986), aff'd
mem. 822 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1987) (general unsecured creditors considered bona-fide purchasers).
24 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) (1988).
25 Section 1963(d)(1)(B) allows the court to issue a preindictment restraining order if, after no-
tice is given to persons with an interest in the property, the court finds that: (1) the government is
likely to prevail on forfeiture, (2) the restraining order is necessary to preserve the property, and (3)
that the need to preserve the property outweighs the hardship on any party affected by the order.
26 Section 1963(d)(2) allows the government to obtain an ix parte restraining order if it demon-
strates that there is probable cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture and that notice
would jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture. The order can be obtained for a
maximum of 10 days, unless it is extended for good cause.
27 The question whether the indictment is sufficient to satisfy constitutional standards of due
process for issuance of a restraining order without a prior hearing has generated much litigation. See,
e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 678-80 (1974); United States v.
Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 725-31 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3221 (1989); United States
v. Musson, 802 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Keller, 730 F. Supp. 151, 162-63
(N.D. Il1. 1990); United States v. Draine, 637 F. Supp. 482, 485 (S.D. Ala. 1986); United States v.
Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1345 (D. Colo. 1985). Where a defendant or a third party claimant
[Vol. 65:9961002
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hearing is not foreclosed, it does not articulate the precise contours of
such a hearing.28
B. The Tracing Requirement and Third Party Interests
The extent to which the statute requires the government to trace
assets can dramatically affect third party interests. If the government is
unable to restrain assets because it cannot show they are forfeitable as
proceeds or enterprise interests, and if it cannot take advantage of the
relation back doctrine with respect to such property interests, then there
may be certain assets that a defendant may safely use to pay or secure
ordinary business obligations.
1. Pre-1984 Tracing Decisions
The focus of litigation over asset tracing under RICO has changed
since the passage of the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act, which
added the relation back doctrine to criminal forfeiture and made a de-
fendant's substitute assets forfeitable in certain circumstances. 29 Prior to
the 1984 amendments there was, in effect, no third party forfeiture, and
the only tracing issue was whether forfeiture could be obtained from a
defendant when the specific tainted asset was no longer in his possession
because he had transferred or otherwise disposed of it.3s The 1984
amendments added the substitute assets provision, which provided statu-
tory authority for a court to order forfeiture of a defendant's non-tainted
assets in the event the tainted property had disappeared or diminished in
value.3' As a result of the 1984 amendments, the tracing issue is of little
importance to a defendant because a conviction operates as a judgment
creates any significant doubt about the propriety or extent of a restraining order, courts will ordina-
rily entertain a challenge and, if necessary, hold an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., United States v.
Roth, 912 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 928-29 (4th Cir. 1986),
modified, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,
109 S. Ct. 2546 (1989); United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1468-69 (5th Cir. 1986), modified, 809
F.2d 249 (1987); United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1324-25 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994
(1985); United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Crozier, 674
F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 468 U.S. 1206 (1984); United States v. Long,
654 F.2d 911, 915 (3rd Cir. 1981). Cf United States v. Friedman, 849 F.2d 1488, 1491 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (acknowledging that where forfeiture is based only on the indictment and the connection
between the property and the illegal venture remains to be proved, "it is not entirely clear who owns
the property").
The Supreme Court has reserved judgment on the whether or not a hearing is required under
the Due Process clause. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2666 n.10 (1989). See also Baird
& Vinson, RICO Pretrial Restraints and Due Process: The Lessons of Princeton/Newport, 65 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. (1990); Note, Criminal Forfeitures and the Necessity for a Post-Seizure Hearing: Are CCE and RICO
Rackets for the Government?, 57 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 776, 782 n.28 (1983).
28 See H. R. REP. No. 98-103D, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 206 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, at 3389 n.42 ("This provision is not intended to preclude a third party
with an interest in property that is or may be subject to a restraining order from participating in a
hearing regarding the order, however.").
29 See supra note 2 and infra note 31.
30 Although courts have permitted the forfeiture of assets held by a third party in some circum-
stances, see United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981) (restraining order issued under Con-
tinuing Criminal Enterprise statute against airplane transferred by defendant to attorney), the
statute did not provide for third party forfeiture and these cases dealt primarily with sham
transactions.
31 Section 1963(m) provides:
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against him for the value of the property ordered forfeited, and that
judgment can be satisfied out of any property, not just tainted property.
Nonetheless, the tracing requirement can significantly determine the out-
come of third party claims against the defendant or his assets, because
the relation back doctrine and the restraining order provisions do not
apply to substitute assets.
Section 1963(a) specifically sets out what property is forfeitable. The
consequence of a criminal RICO conviction is that the defendant forfeits
any "interest in" or "property ... affording a source of influence over"
an enterprise, and "property constituting, or derived from" proceeds ob-
tained from racketeering activity. 32 Although the nature of property in-
terests that may be forfeited is broadly defined in subsection (b),3 3 these
property interests are forfeitable only if they have the kind of relation-
ship to illegal activity set forth in subsection (a). In other words, the
property must be an enterprise interest or proceeds of racketeering activ-
ity. If the specific subsection (a) property is not in the defendant's hands,
then there is nothing to forfeit, unless that specific property can be lo-
cated in the hands of a third party.
Nevertheless, some courts prior to the 1984 amendments found that
tracing was not a requirement of forfeiture from a convicted defendant.
In United States v. Ginsburg,34 the en banc Seventh Circuit held that an
attorney convicted of RICO, based on bribes paid to a local board of tax
appeals, could be ordered to forfeit his one-half interest in legal fees that
his law firm generated from the illegal conduct. The defendant argued
that no forfeiture could be ordered because the government had failed to
prove that the fees were still in existence. The court rejected this
argument.3 5
If any of the property described in subsection (a), as a result of any act or omission of the
defendant-
(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;
(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or
(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without
difficulty;
the court shall order forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the value of the
property described in paragraphs (1) through (5).
18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (1988).
32 Upon conviction, section 1963(a) directs the court to order all "property" described in sub-
section (a) forfeited to the U.S. Some courts have held that forfeiture of the covered property is
mandatory. United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Navarro-
Ordas, 770 F.2d 959, 970 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); United States v. Kra-
vitz, 738 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
33 Section 1963(b) defines property subject to forfeiture as:
(1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in land; and
(2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests, claims,
and securities.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1988).
34 773 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1985).
35 See also United States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985);
United States v. Navarro-Ordas, 770 F.2d 959, 969-70 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016
(1986); United States v. Robilotto, 828 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 (1988);
United States v. Amend, 791 F.2d 1120 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986).
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The Ginsburg court's analysis rests on a number of dubious proposi-
tions. First, the court claimed that the statute is unambiguous in not re-
quiring a forfeitable interest to be in existence at the time of the
conviction and that the remedial purposes of Congress demonstrate no
intent to limit the forfeiture remedy to assets in existence at the time of
conviction. Second, it noted that requiring the government to trace for-
feitable assets such as cash would severely undermine the effectiveness of
forfeiture. Finally, it concluded that because money is fungible, a forfei-
ture judgment against money could be satisfied out of any of the defend-
ant's money. To support its conclusion, the court reasoned that because
the criminal forfeiture is in personam, the judgment follows the individual.
These rationales do not withstand scrutiny.
The fact that criminal forfeiture is in personam has no obvious bearing
on whether forfeiture operates on property that no longer exists. Forfei-
ture is still forfeiture and, by definition, requires something to be for-
feited.36 To be sure, it is entirely possible that a statute authorizing in
personam criminal forfeiture could define the object of forfeiture to in-
clude any or all assets of a defendant so that the forfeiture order would
operate like a money judgment against the defendant. In contrast, a
money judgment against an individual defendant would not be possible
in an in rem forfeiture action where jurisdiction attaches to the property,
and the individual is not before the court. The fact that a money judg-
ment type forfeiture could have been accomplished in a criminal forfei-
ture statute does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that it was so
intended in RICO.
In fact, the statute is straightforward in defining what may be for-
feited: proceeds, derivative proceeds, or interests in the enterprise itself.
It also clearly describes the form and type of property interests that are
included in forfeitable property. The Ginsburg court's analysis simply ig-
nores the statutory language, relying instead on the interpretation that
the statute does not explicitly state that the property to be forfeited must
be in existence at the time of the conviction. This is hardly surprising;
indeed, one might have thought it obvious that what does not exist can-
not be forfeited. What is more surprising, and more significant for pur-
poses of legal analysis, is that at the time Ginsburg was decided the statute
did not state that a forfeiture judgment would operate as a general claim
against any and all of the defendant's assets. Instead, the statute defined
particular categories of property that could be forfeited.3 7
The further rationale that forfeiture would be more effective if it op-
erated as a money judgment is, of course, no justification for reading the
statute contrary to its plain terms. Where the statute explicitly defines
what can be forfeited, the argument that it would be more effective if it
permitted broader forfeiture is more properly addressed to Congress.
36 Forfeiture is the divestiture of property without compensation. Its effect is "to transfer the
title to the spedfic thing from the owner to the sovereign." 36 AM. JUR. 2D Forfeitures and Penalties § 1
(1968) (emphasis added).
37 See the discussion of the 1986 substitute assets amendments, supra notes 29-31 and accompa-
nying text.
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Nor is the argument that money is fungible a basis for allowing a
lower court to order non-specific forfeiture with respect to subsection (a)
assets. Fungibility is merely a characteristic of money which makes it diffi-
cult to trace. But this characteristic casts no light on what the statutory
language requires in order to forfeit subsection (a) proceeds. To say that
because money is fungible, any money of a defendant can be forfeited,
reads out of the statute the language that makes property derived from
illegal proceeds forfeitable. If any property may be forfeited, there is no
need for a provision that makes derivative property forfeitable.
Moreover, the use of the commercial concept of fungibility is com-
pletely foreign to criminal law. Fungibility is defined in the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC") as goods "of which any unit is . . . the
equivalent of any other like unit." 38 Money, corn, and wheat meet this
description, and the consequences of their fungibility are defined by
commercial statutes. The quality of fungibility determines the obligations
of a seller of goods to deliver, 39 and of a party holding fungible goods as
security.40 These consequences of fungibility were developed by years of
commercial practice embodied in the common law and various statutory
codifications of the law of sales before they were codified in the U.C.C.
But, contrary to the view of the Seventh Circuit, the criminal law has no
analogous history of common law or statutory special treatment of
fungibility.
The decision of the Seventh Circuit is even more puzzling in light of
the fact that, subsequent to the indictment in Ginsburg, Congress
amended the statute to add the substitute assets provision. As a result of
the amendment, if the government cannot find the specific forfeitable
property, it may satisfy the judgment out of other assets of the defend-
ant. The policy rationale for this amendment is similar to the policy ra-
tionale offered by the Seventh Circuit in support of its holding, namely
that it would make the remedy more effective.41 Some argue that the
38 U.C.C. § 1-201(17) (1989).
39 A seller can satisfy a contract for the sale of fungible goods by delivery of any unit. U.C.C. § 8-
107(1) (1989). Likewise, a seller may agree to sell a portion of fungible goods even if the precise
quantity is unknown, and the warranty of merchantability requires delivery of fungible goods of "fair
average quality." U.C.C. §§ 2-105(3), 2-314(2)(b) (1989).
Also, where there is a casualty to non-fungible goods, and the seller is without fault but still
bears the risk of loss, he may avoid a contract for the sale of goods identified to the contract. U.C.C.
§ 2-613(a) (1989). But the seller may not avoid the contract in these circumstances if the contract is
for the sale of fungible goods, unless the parties have agreed to the sale of specific goods. Valley
Forge Flag Co. v. New York Dowel & Moulding Import Co., 90 Misc. 2d 414, 395 N.Y.S.2d 138, 139
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977).
40 A secured party may commingle fungible property held as security for a debt. UCC § 9-
207(2)(d) (1989).
41 Mr. President, I am pleased that the bill we are about to approve contains provisions
allowing the Federal Government to seize and obtain forfeiture of substitute assets.... In
combination with the money laundering provision in S. 2878, we will make it more difficult
for drug dealers to keep the profits of their criminal activities.
132 CONG. REC. S14,270 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
In addition, this package contains provisions aimed at striking at the financial underpin-
nings of organized crime and drug trafficking syndicates, through the use of forfeiture of
substitute assets provisions and a new crime against money laundering, both of which will
assist law enforcement agencies in seizing the proceeds of drug traffickers.
132 CONG. REC. S14,270 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986) (statement of Sen. Biden).
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amendment simply clarified what the statute was originally intended to
mean. This view ignores the legislative history that explicitly states that
the amendment was necessary because a defendant could avoid forfeiture
where he had disposed of or wasted the forfeitable property.42 This view
also fails to explain why subsection (m) was necessary if forfeiture oper-
ated as ajudgement against any assets of a convicted defendant, and dis-
regards the structure of the statute, which distinguishes between the
treatment of subsection (a) assets and substitute assets under subsection
(m).
2. Tracing After the 1984 Amendments
Although, at first blush, one might conclude that the addition of sub-
section (m) eliminates whatever tracing requirement might have existed
with respect to forfeitable assets, that is not the case. The substitute as-
sets provision does not get rid of tracing. Instead, it gives the govern-
ment an alternative remedy where tracing is impossible or ineffective. As
a result of the substitute assets provision, tracing is usually of little im-
portance to the defendant. Likewise, the government no longer has any
great motivation to seek forfeiture of specific property because it can
achieve the full impact of forfeiture by seizing either specified assets or
substitute assets.
Nevertheless, tracing is critical to the rights of third parties, because
two of the government's most powerful tools-the relation back doctrine
and the restraining order provisions--do not apply to substitute assets.
Subsection (c) vests tide in the United States as of the date of the crime
only with regard to "property described in subsection (a)."'43 Tide to
substitute property forfeitable under subsection (m) is not affected by the
relation back doctrine. Likewise, the restraining order provisions may be
invoked only "to preserve the availability of property described in sub-
section (a) for forfeiture under this section." 44 The restraining order
provisions make no reference to subsection (m) assets.
In light of the government's ability to obtain the value of forfeitable
assets from any of the defendant's assets, indictments often do not spec-
42 The question before us now is whether or not we should have the ability to go after
substitute assets. That is, if they have been successful in hiding their assets or transferring
their assets, could we not go after a similar amount of other assets they might have in which
they have hidden their previous ones? Why do we do this? Because we are dealing with
tough, smart people who try to stay one step ahead of the law try to hide their assets when-
ever they can.
Some will say we do not need this. TheJustice Department has asked for it. In fact it
was part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act when it left this House several years ago
similarly was passed in the other body. Somehow it got dropped out in conference.
132 CONG. REc. H6,679 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1986) (statement of Rep. Lungren).
The bill also closes a loophole in the current law, by permitting the seizure and forfei-
ture of substitute assets if a drug trafficker has transferred his profits to a third party or
placed them beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
132 CONG. REC. S14,270 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
43 Subsection (c) provides that:
All right title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests in the United States
upon the commisison of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988).
44 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1) (1988).
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ify the property that will be forfeited upon conviction. In white collar
cases, the proceeds are often cash. Although the government may be able
to specify the amount of the cash, it is frequently not in a position to
identify specific cash or derivative property that is forfeitable. An indict-
ment that merely states that cash in the amount of three million dollars is
forfeitable does not entitle the government to the benefit of the relation
back doctrine or to the use of the restraining order provisions. Accord-
ingly, since the government could only reach assets transferred to a
third-party business if it could trace them to tainted property, businesses
dealing with indicted customers may be in a relatively strong position in
taking payment from assets not specifically identified in the indictment as
forfeitable. 45
II. Conclusion
A tracing requirement, while not a panacea, would give some cer-
tainty to third parties with claims against a RICO defendant. The gov-
ernment could not seize interests not directly tied to wrongdoing in an
indictment, and third parties would not have to contend with the relation
back doctrine regarding payments out of substitute assets. When the
government does not specify all property or any property subject to for-
feiture, the third party could, for example, obtain payment on its loan or
on its accounts payable after the indictment is handed down.
This enhanced certainty would not, of course, ameliorate all of the
problems facing a third party claimant. The government may still specify
all property of the defendant as forfeitable, seek to restrain non-forfeit-
able assets in order to protect forfeitable assets, 46 deny standing to an
unsecured creditor, and take positions with respect to secured creditors
that are contrary to commercial principles and expectations. Third party
proceedings will still be conducted in a manner that severely disadvan-
tages the claims of third parties. Although the tracing requirement may
provide a ray of light, it will still behoove a business dealing with a poten-
tial or actual RICO defendant to exercise extreme caution lest the third
party business become an innocent victim of the government's war on
crime.
45 But see United States v. McKinney (In re Billman), No. 90-7029 (4th Cir. Oct. 3, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, USAPP File), in which the Fourth Circuit held that the government could restrain
funds transferred by a RICO defendant to a co-defendant not charged with RICO violations.
Although the government was unable to prove at a hearing on its request for a restraining order that
the transferred funds were tainted, the court concluded that the transferred funds were the substi-
tute assets of the RICO defendant, and the transferee was entitled to keep them only if she could
show that she was a bona fide purchaser without notice that the funds were subject to forfeiture.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the assets transfered to her could be restrained pending the
outcome of the criminal trial.
46 See United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988).
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